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Fatigue, Indolence And The There Is,
Or, The Temporal Logic Of Collage In
Donald Barthelme’s Snow White
Zuzanna Ładyga
1  “I wish there were some words in the world that were not the words I always hear,” says
Snow White in the opening pages of Barthelme’s first novel (Snow White 6). One of the
words she has every right to be tired of is “collage,” the critics’ all-time favorite among
labels  for  Barthelme’s  literary method.  Once legitimized by Barthelme himself  in his
famous proclamation that collage is the central principle of art in the twentieth century,
the term began a long career of the most precise and self-explanatory critical shortcut to
D. B.’s fiction. In the criticism of the 1970s and 1980s collage is mostly associated with
fragmentation  and  self-referentiality.  In  the  ideological  criticism  of  the  1990s,  the
fragmentation becomes “cultural” and “political” rather than linguistic, but still, nobody
seems to care about  the intricate  mechanism of  referentiality  in Barthelme’s  collage
method  or  about  its  complex  affective  dynamics.  That  the  referential  and  affective
dimension of collage is deeply problematic becomes clear if one returns to Barthelme’s
first presentation of his collage principle, which dates back to an epistolary interview
with  Jerome  Klinkowitz  between  the  fall  of  1971  and  the  summer  of  1972.  In  the
interview, when Klinkowitz asks Barthelme to expand on the rule, the latter dismisses the
possibility that he,  in a typically post-modernist  fashion,  would think of collage as an
abstract aesthetic category. That would probably be “wrong or too general” (Roe 98).
Instead, Barthelme explains:
New York City is or can be regarded as a collage, as opposed to, say, a tribal
village in which all of the huts (or yurts, or whatever) are the same hut duplicated.
The point of collage is that unlike things are stuck together to make, in the best
case, a new reality. This new reality, in the best case, may be or imply a comment
on the other reality from which it came, and may be also much else. It is an itself, if
it’s successful: Harold Rosenberg’s “anxious object,” which does not know whether
it’s a work of art or a pile of junk. (Maybe I should have said that anxiety is the
central principle of all art in the etc., etc.?). (Roe 98)1 
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2 Collage  is,  therefore,  not  just  a  pile  of  “verbal  trash”  (Dickstein  62),  an  “overtly
metafictional” collection of fragments (McCaffery 153), but an instance of referential
bidirectionality, of spatio-temporal confusion in which a new reality is being created as
the collage’s future, but this new reality simultaneously “comments on,” i.e. explains and
responds to  another  reality  that  is  its  past.  What  Barthelme  suggests  is  that  the
referential potential of such illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as collage is governed
by a specific temporal logic. And as Richard Ohmann, one of the most insightful students
of  performativity  explains,  this  temporal  logic  is  the  reverse  of  the  immediately
perceived. Although mimetic effect seems to emulate the work of memory in its constant
reference  back  to  the  memory’s  past  in  the  real  event,  the  actual  time  vector  of
recollection  is  opposite;  it  is  a  future-oriented,  reality-building  performative  that
anachronously constructs the memory it refers to. The two-directionness also works the
other way round; the synchrony and creative power of perlocutionary acts are an illusion
because their causative potential relies on their anachronous iterability.
3  But this is only a part of Barthelme’s definition. For it is one thing to say that collage
works due to the spatio-temporal confusion within the referential faculty of language,
and quite another to liken this spatio-temporal confusion to anxiety.2 At this point of his
definition,  Barthelme is  not  simply  parroting Rosenberg,  or  humorously  evoking the
Heideggerian Angst. Rather, he presents anxiety as an affective condition of oscillation
between the disorderly state of being (junk, in a pile) and the orderly state of being (a
piece of art, as a work), that is, as a condition from beyond the limits of epistemological
inquiry (the anxious object “does not know”). It is,  in short, an anxiety caused by an
overabundance of reality rather than by its instability or uncertain ontological status.
4  What are the poetic consequences of this definition? How does the vision of anxiety as
the motor of referentiality influence Barthelme’s literary subjects? One way of pursuing
the implications of the collage principle is prompted by a philosophical concept of the
there is authored by the ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, a concept which denotes
the experience of a terror caused not by the lack of being/reality but by its excess and
inescapability. According to Levinas, this inescapable, and utterly impersonal,  horrific
overabundance of being provides an environment for subjective development, i.e. for the
traumatic encounter with the Other in exposure to his/her presence,  even though it
never partakes of the process and in fact must be left behind in its course, if the subject is
to emerge at all. Levinas calls the experience “the first emergence of the self,” of being
which in its eruption starts “the construction of a subject, who, from out of the neuter,
will affirm and posit himself” (Levinas, Is It Righteous to Be? 212). Crucially, by saying that
the self emerges out of the there is in an attempt to escape the horror of its abundant
impersonality,  the  affect  that  Levinas  situates  at  the  basis  of  the  subject’s  affective
development  is  none  other  than  anxiety,  which  Barthelme  associates  with  the
performance of collage,3 anxiety over the terrifying presence of “beings and things that
collapse into their ‘materiality’” (Existence and Existents 54).4 Because Levinas’s notion of
the there is narrates the subjective process as a sequence of anxiety-driven eruptions and
collapses of realist abundance into the materiality of there is, it might serve as a useful
lens  for  discussing  the  way  in  which  “anxious”  elements  of  Barthelme’s  collage
interchangeably establish and collapse the referential scaffolding of his texts’  literary
subjectivities.
5  What follows is therefore an attempt to pursue the conceptual correspondence between
collage and the there is and to examine Donald Barthelme’s first and most collage-like
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novel,  Snow  White,  from  the  perspective  of  Levinas’s  ethical  philosophy.  For  if  we
investigate the phenomenological implications of Barthelme’s definition of collage, then
clearly  there  is  much  more  to  say  about  Snow  White’s  referential  method  and  the
subjectivity constructed by its discoursethan the book’s commentators have been willing
to acknowledge. Levinas, a thinker famous for his relentless preoccupation with how the
real impinges on an essentially language-based subjectivity seems to be a good ally in a
search for those “different words” that Snow White wishes for so much.5
 
1. Snow White’s Collage as the There Is
6 Let me begin with a hypothesis that the temporal and affective structure of the there is
reflects  the  dynamics  of  the  collage  method  of  constructing  literary  subjectivity  in
Barthelme’s first novel. This reciprocity operates on all narrative levels, so that whether
we focus on the book’s characterization, its intertextual allusions, its autobiographical
aspect, or its rapport with the reader, Snow White’s subjectivity appears to replicate the
pulsating  rhythm  of  ontological  and  epistemological  withdrawals  and  escapes  that
Levinas  associates  with  the  experience  of  anxiety  towards  the  rustling  there  is.  For
Levinas, the temporality of the experience of there is is complicated by its componential
events  of  fatigue and  indolence,  which  involve  the  same  temporal  movement  of
anticipation and refusal as does the affect of anxiety, and which just like the anxiety from
Barthelme’s definition of collage have an impossible-to-pinpoint relation to the present.
The  murmuring  diachrony  of  the  there  is gives  way  to  existents  only  through  a
directionless  “time-lag,”  occasioned  by  the  hypostasis  of  fatigue  and  indolence,  a
temporal gap that is inevitable just as it is unbearable (EE 25). Accordingly, the time-lag
that  characterizes  the  experience  of  the  there  is  is  responsible  for  the  jerky  and
“disturbing” narrative line of Snow White as well  as for its method of referential  and
performative uses of language.
7  Barthelme’s poetics emulates the rhythm of the there is, its withdrawals and hypostases,
so as to organize the ethical time structure of the novel’s collage subject construct. And it
does  so  vigorously  already  on  the  first  page  which  features  the  first  of  the  novel’s
emphatic withdrawals:
She is  a tall  dark  beauty  containing  a  great  many beauty  spots:  one  above  the
breast, one above the belly, one above the knee, one above the ankle, one above the
buttocks, one on the back of the neck. All of these are on the left side, more or less
in a row, as you go up and down:
F0
A8
F0
A8
F0
A8
F0
A8
F0
A8
F0
A8
F0
A8
The hair is black as ebony, the skin white as snow. (SW 3)
8 This perfect illustration of the idea of de-centering presents Snow White as a line of
beauty spots on an invisible map of fragmented body parts.  At first glance,  both the
etymology  of  the  beauty  spot  (a  landmark)  and the  layout  of  the  novel’s  first  page
foreground the spatial character of Snow White’s identity ― Barthelme’s parody of the
blazon form and of the traditional trope of a woman as an unknown, fetishization-prone
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landscape ― which in turn immediately discloses Snow White’s explicit commentary on
itself as a printed text whose physical form constitutes its entire content and is just about
all the reader can be certain of.
9  Yet,  at  the second glance,  a glance that resists the automatism of reading practices
usually applied to postmodern fiction, one notes that despite the whiteness of her body
parts, Snow White is a “dark beauty,” as if the darkness of her beauty spots were the only
available things to define her. And furthermore, that although the spots are said to be
located on the three-dimensional map of a body, they form a landscape that only has two
dimensions. Both color and two-dimensionality bring the description of Snow White close
to what Levinas defines as the “first ontological experience” ― the there is (Is it Righteous
to  Be?  212).  She  is  a  nocturnal  discursive  landscape  which  may  host  the  ethical
subjectivity,  for  the  description  offers  the  novel’s  first  commentary  on  its  yet
undifferentiated stage and the yet undifferentiated status of its characters, all of whom
seem immersed in the anonymity of the impersonal space of the there is of the novel’s
discourse.
10  The notion of the limitless topography of the there is justifies Snow White’s being a line of
bullets whose ordering counters the horizontal organization of other printed symbols on
the page. As Levinas explains, “the points of nocturnal space [of the there is] do not refer
to each other as in illuminated space” (EE 53). Instead, “there is no perspective, they are
not situated. There is a swarming of points” (EE 53). Read in the context of Levinas’s
words, Barthelme’s description of Snow White introduces her not as a character of any
kind but as the nocturnal landscape of the novel’s pre-subjective discursive abundance in
which a consciousness of being, and with it, the possibility of the subject, has not yet
emerged.
11  That  such an interpretative conclusion with regard to Snow White is  actually quite
feasible finds support in Barthelme’s 1974 stage adaptation of Snow White, in which the
book’s opening description of vertically distributed bullet-marks is substituted with the
image of Snow White’s black hair hanging from the window, being “immensely long,
falling almost all the way to the stage” (Snow White [1974] 299). Just like the bullets in the
printed  text,  the  oppressive  abundance  of  the  hair  distorts  the  perspective  of  the
otherwise realist surroundings of the following events. Of special relevance for the role of
Snow White in Barthelme’s novel is Levinas’s word “swarming,” whose implication of
dense plurality will frequently resonate on the level of plot in the image of the dwarves’
communal cohabitation and the image of numberless waves of women street protesters.
Similarly, it will resound on the level of narrative organization in the density of the “we”
narrative position which Barthelme calls “floating” (“Pacifica Radio Interview” 252), as
well  as  in  the  profusion  and  indistinguishability  of  the  book’s  numerous  individual
narrators. Finally, the swarming of points on the first page anticipates the revolutionary
subversiveness of both the characters and the narrative structure as such, because via the
connection to collectivity the image brings to the fore the social aspect of the there is and
the intimate relation between the impersonal space-time of the latter and the genealogy
of collective freedom and justice. Most importantly, however, it accentuates the position
of Snow White as an undifferentiated, two-dimensional, self-sufficient pre-subjectivity.
12  So adequately thematized by Barthelme in Snow White’s description, the effacement of
perspective is soon revealed to be the key architectural principle of the novel’s universe
and the  first  evidence  for  the  non-ontological  structure  of  its  subjectivity.  Even the
purely visual  elements such as  the image of  feminist  protesters,  viewed through the
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window as flat, topographic symbols (“the plum colored head the center of the target, the
wavy navy skirt the bold circumference. The white or black legs flopping out in front” (
SW 8)),  or the image of  typewriter girls  hiding Olivettis  under their skirts take their
oneiric and/or absurd quality from a reductive compression of viewpoints announced at
the  novel’s  onset,  in  the  two-dimensional  portrait  of  Snow  White.  Of  course,  such
compressions  of  visual  perspectives  as  the  above  are  only  the  most  obvious  ones;
however,  the  conflations  of  different  levels  of  reference  are  much  more  complex.
Adamant in their  thematic  focus on Barthelme’s  referential  technique,  these are,  for
example:  the  episode  of  Snow  White’s  writing  poetry  by  means  of  rearranging  the
apartment  (SW  37),  the  scene  of  her  watering  the  blooming  flowers  of  the  Maoist
revolution  (SW  16),  or  the  event  of  Hogo  hiding  his  plan  to  get  rid  of  Paul  in  the
“humidor” to keep it “fresh and exciting” (SW 153).
13  Although a canonical postmodern reading would tend to classify these perspective-less
images  as  typical  instances  of“playing”  with  language  and  its  dysfunctional  uses
(McCaffery 160; 162), a reading inspired by Levinas’s conception of the perspective-less
there is prompts another explanation. In its light, the removal of perspective is not a sign
of dysfunction. Instead, it makes perfect sense as regards the sustention of the basis for
the construction of an ethical literary subjectivity, because Barthelme’s radical rejection
of perspective, this Renaissance-born consolidator of totalizing ontological models of the
subject, indicates that the subjectivity of Snow White aims to emerge otherwise, and that
its construction will focus on avoiding the totalizing conceptualizations.
14  It is in this context that we should perhaps interpret the fact that the directory of Snow
White’s  body  parts  listed  in  the  opening  description  does  not  include  her  head.
Barthelme’s gesture of centering the narrative around a figure who lacks the center of
cognitive powers is to lay bare the absence of any consciousness and self-reflexivity, and
consequently,  to  question  the  possibility  of  conceiving  literary  subjects  in  purely
ontological or epistemological terms. The absence of consciousness in the description of
Snow White’s all-encompassing presence confirms our initial speculations about Snow
White’s role in the book; representing the dimensionless there is, her discursive presence
in the novel serves to prepare the ground for the emergence of affective non-indifference
and finally, the subjectivity. Barthelme himself confirms this view in one of his interview
comments: “I think it would be wrong to try and locate, say, the character of Snow White.
She is a pretext for being able to write, to use certain kinds of language” (“Pacifica Radio
Interview” 255).  His  comment displays remarkable proximity to the definition of  the
impersonal  there  is,  because it  similarly  insists  on the total  absence of  any traces  of
personhood in his literary “pretext.” In other words, the language construct known as
Snow White turns out to be sublimely compatible with the structure of the there is.
15  Speaking of anonymity and impersonality of the there is in the context of Barthelme’s
eponymous character, it is impossible not to mention the nameless third person narrator
of the initial description. Especially since, for Levinas, the linguistic event of the third
person in general is one of the best empirical illustrations for the anonymity of the there
is, which is not to be understood as uncertain authorship but as no authorship (EE 52).
What is interesting about this narrator is that his intrusive, voyeuristic gaze at Snow
White’s physicality clashes with the dispassionate, mechanical tone of his listing of her
body parts. From the perspective of radical ethics, this clash embodies the paradox of
what Levinas calls the “impersonal vigilance” of the there is,a simultaneous participation
and immersion in,  as  well  as  a  detachment from,  the there  is (EE 55).  In the plot  of
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Barthelme’s  novel  the paradox is  exhibited in the attitude towards Snow White that
prevails among the dwarves. On the one hand, they wish for a life without her, but on the
other,  they  cannot  imagine  that  sort  of  existence.  For  example,  when  Snow  White
complains that her “uninteresting” life has been the result of insufficient imagination,
the  dwarves  understand her  complaint  as  a  “powerful  statement  of  [their]  essential
mutuality, which can never be sundered or thorn, or broken apart, dissipated, diluted,
corrupted, or finally severed, not even by art in its manifold and dreadful guises” (SW 59).
Because this passage comes from the dwarves’ conversation with Snow White conducted
at the time when she is struggling creatively with her “dirty great poem,” its manner of
elaborating the idea of a Levinasian rapport-without-egress seems to mark the moment
when the novel’s subjectivity is unsuccessfully struggling for the emergence out of the
there is. Just like Snow White’s imagination, the language of the novel is at the same time
barren but “stirring,” vigilantly withdrawn but ready to participate in the pre-subjective
preparation, which is nevertheless still delayed. The preparatory character of the poem
episode  is  confirmed  by  Snow  White’s  choice  of  its  first  words  ―  “bandaged  and
wounded… Run together” —which she claims to be a metaphor for the self’s defensive
reaction towards the Other  (SW 59).  Snow White’s  explanation of  the  metaphor,  the
reversed chronology of bandaging and wounding, and finally, the fact that the expression
“bandaged and wounded” does not actually run together, testifies to the novel’s inability
to transgress the immobilizing and totalizing regime of its language and allow for any,
most notably the reader’s,  otherness to participate in the radicalization of the book’s
semantic structures for the purpose of the emergence of the text’s counter-solipsistic
subjectivity, in the form of the Saying.6 Therefore, counter to those readings of Snow
White which emphasize her rebelliousness and place her at the pantheon of the most
radically feminist literary characters, we might conclude that despite all the efforts at
creative playing with the discourse of the novel, she is a much more domesticated figure
and a much less subversive narrative element than she at first appears. This is perhaps
why  John Leland  talks  about  Snow  White in  terms  of  “ontological  despair”  (806),  an
implosive  impasse  that  transpires  in  a monotonous,  almost  “mechanical”  manner  of
poetic randomization and fragmentation occasioned by Snow White’s appearance in the
novel (Dickstein 62).
16  Using ethical terminology, one might carry this argument further and think of Snow
White  as  a  textual  construct  whose  experimental,  subversive  potential  remains
constrained by the mechanic monotony of the Said. Although her presence in Barthelme’s
novel as the epitome of the pre-subjective “murmur of discourse” indicates that she is
also the embodiment of the subjectivity-founding urge to escape this murmur, the fact
that her rebelliousness is predictable,  her experiments never truly experimental,  and
thus never implosive with regard to the ontological structure of the book’s subjectivity,
suggests rather that Snow White represents the discursive barrier to the emergence of
the  ethical  subjectivity.  This  is  visible  both  on  the  level  of  plot  and  in  the  type  of
linguistic experimentation that characterizes Snow White’s utterances.
17  As far as Snow White’s plot is concerned, the title character appears, on the one hand, to
be the symbol of rebelliousness against the conventions of the dwarves’ world she does
not “like” (SW 68) and from which she wants to escape (SW 102) since she feels there as if
she were “in a wrong time” (SW 131). Her disgust with the surrounding reality, because
“what is, is insufficient” (SW 135) states the ethical desire for something more than the
there  is.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  Snow White’s  tendency to  search for  ways  of
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rebelling in the already existing and standardized body of literature from Sartre to Mao
indicates that her revolutionary potential,  her creative and ethical capacity is in fact
quite limited.
18  The  superficiality  of  Snow  White’s  subversiveness  is  particularly  apparent  in  the
attempts at linguistic experimentation that accompany her appearance in the novel. For
example, even though she is the one to interrupt the narrative stability by speaking in a
mixture  of  stream  of  consciousness  and  cut-ups,  these  are  frequently  the  most
comprehensible  and  the  least  surprising  and  undecipherable  elements  of  the  story.
Consider a sample sequence of the first cut-up, whose bits cohere so easily that the effect
of any radical writerly-ness their fragmented form initially promised is totally lost:
Those men hulking hulk in closets and outside gestures eventuating against a white
screen difficulties intelligence I only wanted one plain hero of incredible size and
soft, flexible manners parts thought dissembling limb add up the thumbprints on
my shoulders Seven is too moves too much and is absent partly different levels of
calculated emotional release calculated paroxysms… Edward never extra density of
the blanched product rolling tongue child straight ahead broken exterior facing
natural gas To experience a definition placed neatly where you can’t reach it and
higher up Daytime experiences choler film bliss. (SW 31)
19 Read from the perspective of the passage in which Snow White says that not to find real
men “would be a disappointment” because she would have to satisfy herself “with the
subtle falsity of color films of unhappy love affairs, made in France, with a Mozart score”
(42), this apparently experimental fragment reveals itself to be a dispassionate, realistic
description  of  Snow  White’s  stereotyped  perception  of  her  lover’s  hulking  and
paroxysmal body movements during sexual intercourse. The fragment owes its mimetic
precision to the random jumps of her thought from past colorful wishes (“I wanted a
hero”)  to  a  series  of  film poses,  as  if  taken from French melodramas,  as  well  as  to
musically  rhythmical  jerks  of  Snow  White’s  perspective  on  her  lover’s  body  from
“dissembling” to “straight ahead,” from the view of the “limb” to “parts of faces” to
“tongue.” As the most experimental of poetic techniques creates the opposite effect to
the expected, the equation between the category of postmodern subject and the notion of
syntactic disassemblage (so often emphasized in metafictional criticism) loses its validity.
In  this  fragment  and  other  similar  ones,  there  is  no  implosion  of  meaning  and  no
questioning of the ontological dimension of the book’s subject construction. Instead, the
subjective  process  is  paralyzed  by  the  endless  profusion  of  its  possible  references.
Although the desire for an emergence out of this linguistic abundance is somehow there
in the effort to experiment, no actual utterance betrays traces of the an-archic ethical
encounter with alterity, i.e. no actual utterance mobilizes an unleashing of semantic and
tonal vertigoes that would effectuate the shattering of the conventions of the Said.
20  A similar regularity is observable in Snow White’s capitalized insertions. Given that the
ethical  subjectivity occurs as a rupture of language,  one might rush to classify these
“narrative breakers” as the dialogically disruptive, ideal candidates for the role of the
subjectivity-producing Sayings. Yet, the mechanical interruptiveness of the insertions as
regards narrative cohesion does not yet make them ethically radical. Sometimes, they
echo Snow White’s memories, “WHAT SNOW WHITE REMEMBERS: THE HUNTSMAN/THE
FOREST/THE STEAMING KNIFE” (SW 39), or her fears, “IN THE AREA OF FEARS SHE FEARS
MIRRORS/APPLES/POISONED COMBS (SW 17). Sometimes, like real bits of a visual collage,
they  reproduce  the  newspaper  headlines  such  as  “ROME.  ANOTHER  DEFEAT…THE
ITALIAN POSTAL SERVICE ABIDES NO RINGERS IN ITS RANKS” (SW 115). And sometimes,
Fatigue, Indolence And The There Is, Or, The Temporal Logic Of Collage In Don...
European journal of American studies, Vol 5, No 3 | 2010
7
they  parrot  academic  discourse,  especially  the  bizarrely  referential  collocations  of
literary  criticism,  for  example,  “THE  SECOND  GENERATION  OF  ENGLISH  ROMANTICS
INHERITED THE PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST” (SW 24),  or “PUSHKIN DISPLAYED VERBAL
FACILITY…AS  A  STYLIST  DOSTOYEVSKI  HAD  MANY  SHORTCOMINGS”  (SW 143).  Yet,
whatever they refer to, and however intrusive they appear, the insertions never manage
to unsettle the ontological or epistemological stability of the Barthelme text. In fact, they
strengthen it. The allusion to the Romantics quoted above coincides with and explains
Paul’s  speech  about  his  identity  problems  and  Henry’s  confession  of  his  personal
weaknesses.  The  coincidence  creates  the  effect  of  a  natural  continuity  between  the
Romantic  escape  and  the  sense  of  being  socially  besieged,  as  compared  with  Paul’s
penchant for the retractive poetics of palinodes, and Henry’s definition of his misery as
the “Inmitten-ness of the Lumpwelt” (SW 29). Provided that we understand subjectivity in
Levinasian terms as a non-totalizable, anti-ontological structure of substitution-for-the-
Other, the “narrative breakers” do not seem interpretable as ruptures of the text’s Said
because their violation of literary conventions is only illusive. However, as in the case of
Snow White’s fragmented visions, they do mark the moments of struggle with/within the
ontological there is.7
 
2. From the There Is To The Hypostatic Event of
Subjectivity
21 The identity of Snow White’s observer whose words begin the novel does not remain
undisclosed for too long. It is soon revealed by the floating “we” narrator of the second
segment  announcing:  “Bill  is  tired  of  Snow  White”  (SW  4).  The  revelation  not  only
anachronously identifies Bill, the dwarves’ leader, as the impersonally attentive voyeur,
but also dispels any doubt as to the kind of affective motivation Bill might have had for
his peeping. His attitude towards Snow White is that of total weariness. What is more, his
tiredness, we are told, is coupled with a refusal to be touched. Faced with such a condition
of  their  leader,  the dwarves  resort  to  philosophical  speculations as  to whether Bill’s
rejection of physical contact is a symptom of withdrawal understood in a Heideggerian
manner as “a mode of dealing with anxiety,” or as a sign of withdrawal understood in the
vein of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of “a physical manifestation of a metaphysical condition
that is not anxiety” (SW 4).
22  Of course, at this point one might focus the interpretation on the political aspect of
Barthelme’s poetics, from whose perspective Bill’s dissidence is nothing more than an
alarming signal of passive resistance, whereas Bill’s tiredness and refusal to be touched
are straightforward thematizations of Barthelme’s withdrawal of narratorial authority,
which performed so early in the story, releases the text’s politically subversive potential.8
However, without denying the legitimacy of this interpretative possibility, it may also be
argued that Barthelme’s juxtaposition of  Bill’s  weariness and untouchability with the
viewpoints of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty encapsulated in the dwarves’ speculations
about Bill’s relational withdrawal is much more significant for the structure of the novel’s
subjectivity than it may appear at first.
23  Even though Bill’s attitude does not mean he negates the tangibility of the surrounding
world, it certainly means that he distances himself from Merleau-Ponty’s viewpoint, that
unmediated access to an external reality is a real possibility. In this way, Bill’s attitude
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comes to express Barthelme’s principle of referentiality, his poetic strategy, which from
the  opening  episode  onwards  will  exploit  the  connections  between  representation
possibilities and the affect of weariness on the one hand, and the affective mechanism of
refusal  on  the  other.  That  such  a  strategy  involves  the  problematics  of  the  ethical
becomes apparent if we bear in mind that the notions of weariness and refusal play a
crucial role in shaping the affective geography of the Levinasian there is.
24  As Levinas writes in Existence and Existents, the there is itself is the excess of being in being
from which there are no exits for beings, i.e. existents. An existent’s relation to the there
is manifests  itself  in  the  interrelated  mental  or  affective  phenomena  of  fatigue and
indolence and their temporal relation to the present. 9 In his discussion of the former,
Levinas discovers that the sense of weariness that makes us realize we exist is not tied to
people or tasks we get tired of, but concerns existence itself. It is the impossibility of
escaping existence, an impossible refusal to the commitment to exist (EE 12). We might
say that fatigue is fatigue as a result of the exhausting “hesitation of a refusal” that
cannot be effected because existence is inescapable. A similar suspension of refusal is
characteristic of indolence, another feeling by means of which the existent establishes
his/her  relationship  with  existence.  Having  nothing  to  do  with  either  relaxation  or
inactivity, indolence resembles fatigue in that it involves
an  attitude  with  regard  to  action.  [It]  is  not  a  simple  indecisiveness,  a  being
overwhelmed by the choices to be made […] it is also not a material impossibility of
performing an action that  is  beyond our strength,  or  the consciousness  of  that
impossibility,  [or]  a  fear  of  pain  […]  Indolence  is  essentially  tied  up  with  the
beginning of an action. [It] concerns beginning, as if existence were not there right
off, but preexisted the beginning in an inhibition. There is more here than a span of
duration, flowing imperceptibly between two moments. Or perhaps the inhibition
involved in indolence is  also the revealing of  the beginning which each instant
effects in being an instant. (EE 13)
25 It follows that indolence is the reverse side of fatigue. Its future-oriented suspension of
refusal is, in a sense, the opposite of the past-oriented suspension of refusal in weariness.
But it is not different from fatigue in occasioning the momentary, temporal excess in
which the necessarily mediated awareness of the existence (the there is) emerges on the
part of the existent. Note that Levinas does not really use time as a transparent category
to  describe  what  it  means  to  be tired  or  inactive.  Rather,  he  constructs  his  own
understanding of time. He defines time by its relation to the there is, which is either that
of fatigue or that of indolence. Therefore, the present moment is defined by Levinas as
occurring in the interval  created by the temporal  delay of  fatigue:  the “almost  self-
contradictory moment of the present that tarries behind itself could not be anything but
fatigue. Fatigue does not accompany it, it effects it; fatigue is this time-lag” (EE 25). And it
is precisely this time-lag, this moment of suspension that Levinas associates with the
birth of the consciousness of the pre-ethical Same.
Fatigue is to be sure not a cancellation of one’s contract with being. The delay it
involves  is  nonetheless  an inscription in  existence,  but  what  is  peculiar  to  this
inscription, its sort of hesitation, enables us to surprise it,  to catch sight of the
operation of assuming which the existence that is taken up always already involves.
(EE 25)
26 To make his point crystal clear, Levinas describes the “emergence” of consciousness, the
beginning of the awareness that it is impossible to escape being entirely, as a hypostasis (
EE 25-6), a performative event of self-reification which triggers a desire for the Other and
thus paves the way for an (ethical) subjectivity. Because of the very nature of hypostasis,
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which apart from substantiation is also, as Jeffrey Nealon notes, a logical error, the desire
for alterity and the impossible escapemay actually be accomplished in language even if it
is by nature an instrument of permanent ontologization. This is how the performative
hypostasis comes to signify “the birth of subjectivity” out from the there is, as a Saying (
Alterity Politics 59); the subject is born from a collision of the past-oriented fatigue and future-
oriented indolence.
27  It  is precisely this sort of colliding rhetoric that informs the subject construction in
Barthelme’s  first  novel.  The  novel’s  pre-subjective  drecky  murmur  of  the  there  is,
represented  by  Snow  White,  becomes  mediated  through  the  tropes  of  fatigue  and
indolence. Their interaction, in turn, creates opportunities for the hypostatic disruptions
within  the  text  that  occasion  the  emergence  of  the  novel’s  subject  construct.
Consequently, since the path to subjectivity leads through such an event of substantiation
that starts in fatigue and indolence and ends in the Saying, and since in Snow White the
problematics of these affects are introduced via the character of Bill, the dwarf leader,
then our scrutiny of the novel’sliterary subjectivity must begin with an examination of
Bill’s weariness and indolence and the way in which the tropes develop.
28  Let  us begin with fatigue.  One of  the first  telling instances when fatigue reveals its
tropological significance and hence its role in the construction of the novel’s subjectivity
is the scene when Bill “develops a shamble” (SW 62). Initially diagnosed as “a sign of a lost
mind,” his “shamble” is then quickly re-appraised as a “refreshing” mode of striding
“across something that is not true” (SW 62). Probing further into the nature of this sign’s
and mode’s mysterious reference, we might find it revealing that the moment when we
learn about Bill’s  awkward gait  ― a movement emulating the decelerating energy of
feeling  weary  towards  the  there  is ―  directly  coincides  with  his  speech  about  the
genealogy of his fellow dwarves: “We were all born in National Parks,” he says, “Clem has
his memories of Yosemite, inspiring gorges. Kevin remembers the Great Smokies. Henry
has his Acadian songs and dances” (SW 62). Bill continues the list only to end with the
assertion of the tremendous regional diversity of their origin; however, his seemingly
pointless  proclamation  of  the  dwarves’  non-fictional  roots  in  real  national  parks  of
America loses its innocence in the context of the second meaning of the word “shamble,”
since  apart  from signifying  an  awkward gait,  “shamble”  also  stands  for  “a  scene  of
carnage” (OED). The sense of brutality and massive murderousness inherent in the word
opens the whole scene to an interpretation in which Bill’s shamble relates to the violent
aspect of the novel’s referential use of language. By pointing to the brutal nature of poetic
acts,  of  using “old realities” to create new ones,  the fragment about Bill’s  “shamble”
sheds some light on Barthelme’s definition of collage as an anxious object. Bill’s speech is
resonant  with the memory of  mimetic  carnage that  gave rise  to Clem’s,  Kevin’s  and
Henry’s  fictional  identities,  a  memory underpinned with the horrible murmur of  the
unceasing there is. It thus textualizes the anxiety of a literary collage, a kind of fearful
wonder  at  the  delayed  recognition  of  the  literary  work’s  immersion  in  the  solitary
landscape of the there is  (in the novel represented by Snow White),  coupled with the
momentary realization of a desire to transgress the there is in order to enter a non-
murderous relationship with the reader.
29  This anxiety should be distinguished from the traumatizing fear of the ethical encounter
with  reality,  along  the  lines  of  the  distinction  between  the  violence  of  linguistic
incursions on reality described in Bill’s speech and the violence of the ethical event that I
earlier  referred  to  as  the  rupture  of  the  Saying.  Referentiality  is  in  itself  always  a
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modality  of  the  counter-subjective  totalizing  murderous  efforts  and  thus  it  cannot
instantiate  the  subjective  moment  in  the  text.  In  contrast,  the  shattering  and
undermining  of  all,  especially  the  referential  standards  in  a  literary  text  might  be
construed as ethical violence, as the traumatizing textual rupture out of which a literary
subject  may  arise.  In  this  context,  Bill’s  speech  seems  to  comment  on  Snow  White’s
entanglement with referentiality and perhaps even to mark Barthelme’s recognition of
the latter’s ethical dimension.
30  What  happens  to  the  notion  of  violence  inherent  in  referentiality  as  Bill’s  story
progresses? The next significant manifestation of weariness takes place in the episode
describing his reaction to Snow White’s hair hanging from the window. Bill finds Snow
White’s act,  the “significance of this act” and “the sexual meaning of the hair itself”
utterly “distasteful,” because, as he explains, the situation confronts him with “multiple
meanings” about which he does not know what to do (SW 92-93). Such an aversion to
Snow  White’s  act  on  Bill’s  part  may  be  best  understood  in  the  light  of  the  earlier
argument about the hair serving as a metonymic representation of contact and creativity.
In this context, Bill’s negative reaction to the hair bespeaks of his strong refusal to both
form a relation with Snow White and use it creatively. Furthermore, given that Snow
White’s hair might stand as a transitional object for the dreck of popular culture, Bill’s
unwillingness  to have anything to do with the “hair-project” reinforces the message
conveyed through the image of the “referential shamble.” Like the hair, the dreck of pop-
cultural allusions is overabundant,  but at the same time, some individuals,  like Snow
White for example, mistake it for the exit which Bill, parodying Heidegger, calls the “not-
with” (SW 92). Bill’s allusion to the German philosopher gives clues about the true object
of his own disgust, which seems to be Snow White’s pressing desire for authenticity10 and
for abandoning the inauthentic state of being-in-the-world, being-with-others. Such an
aversion to the category of authentic being on Bill’s part indicates that the map of his
affective responses overlaps, in fact, not with that of Heidegger’s Dasein but more readily
with Levinas’s counter-Heideggerian idea of necessary evasion of the “authentic” there is.
Explaining to himself Snow White’s performance, Bill says:
It [the performance] means that she is nothing else but a goddamn
degenerate!  is  one  way  of  looking  at  it,  at  this  complex  difficult
question.  It  means  that  the  ‘not-with’  is  experienced  as  more
pressing, more real, than the ‘being with’. It means she seeks a new
lover. Quelle tragédie! But the essential loneliness of the person must
also be considered. (SW 92)
31 Although Bill  is  trying  to  understand  Snow White’s  motives,  his  verdict  is  that  her
performance  is  wrong,  degenerate,  and  tragic  in  its  blind  faith  in  the  search  for
authenticity. Moreover, the dwarf leader senses that the attempts to transgress being are
even  “more  real”  in  their  attachment  to  being  than  the  latter’s  affirmations.  They
reestablish one back in the there is.  Consequently, Bill’s reaction to the hair seems to
occasion the novel’s second commentary on the conundrums of its referential strategy.
Importantly, this time the commentary is more direct as it draws the connection between
the  error  of  referentiality  and  the  error  of  desperately  seeking  counter-subjective
authenticity by reverting to consciousness and the there is. Bill’s reaction implies that just
as he cannot avoid reacting to the hair in one way or another, even if his reaction is that
of disgust, Barthelme’s text cannot avoid some sort of a referential relation to its cultural
material, even if it knows this relation to be brutally usurpatory. Although the referential
motion cannot be stopped, the recognition of its link to a separated Sameness and its
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illusion  of  subjective  authenticity  constitutes  the  literary  subject’s  hypostatic
“awakening”  into  the  ethicity  of  language’s  referential  gestures,  the  beyond  of
ontological authenticity.
32  In this context, it is hardly surprising that the significance of the discussed episode for
the novel’s subject construction is verified by its prominent position in Snow White’s 1974
stage adaptation, which locates the scene of the hair hanging down from the window
together with Bill’s reaction to it at the very beginning of the first act. Moreover, in the
play the scene neighbors on the odd, apparently autobiographical conversation about
writing,  whereas  in  the  novel  there  is  no adjacency or  connection between the  two
episodes.  In  what  sounds  like  a  confession  of  a  writer  who  lost  his  inspiration  Bill
addresses a “you” (in the play, the “you” is Kevin) with a confession that he has always
“hoped to make a powerful statement, coupled with a moving plea,” “wanted to provide a
definitive  account  [...]  to  substantiate  an  unsubstantial  report,  [to  launch]  a  three-
pronged attack” (SW 51-52),  but he never managed to succeed,  whereas his audience
always either laughed or was disinterested. The passage marks another of Bill’s recourses
to the issue of brutality inherent in creative endeavors. Just as in the episode about his
shamble,  here too,  Bill  refuses to execute the violence he indolently anticipated and
because of which he is now disarmed and weary. In the play Kevin summarizes this state
with an utterance that is not present in the novel: “You’ve lost your… ability to deal
creatively with the many-faceted problems of existence!” (303). Thus, the fact that Snow
White’s stage adaptation amplifies the ethical dimension of the referential fabric of its
subject construct suggests the writer’s growing awareness of the ethical dimension of his
semantic experiments, an awareness whose exemplary case is the 1975 The Dead Father.11
33  Reading Bill’s fatigue as a trope of the relation between the aesthetic uses of language
and the reality to which they refer,  either by trying to reflect it  or by avoiding any
representation, allows us to explain why Bill’s presence in the narrative is always marked
by his radical refusal to be creative and to participate in any enterprise of his fellow
dwarves  or  Snow  White.  Crucially,  his  constant  repudiations  occasion  the  affective
overlapping of fatigue and indolence. Whether Bill says no to tending the vats, reacting to
Snow White’s hair, or composing “powerful statements,” Bill enacts the consciousness of
a need to escape the state of being forever immersed in the chain of references (the
Levinasian there is), and a recognition that such a flight is an impossible possibility that
cannot be realized in language other than by a denunciation of consciousness itself, a
denunciation observable only through hindsight. What Bill’s fatigue signifies is therefore
the delay of Barthelme’s text’s momentary renunciation of the ontological structure of its
subjectivity as consciousness,  i.e.  its momentary self-questioning and exposure to the
reader that the latter registers post factum as a creative impulse to make sense of the text.
The ethical moment of the reader’s participation is fleeting because, as Bill’s story has
allegorically shown us, by miming Bill’s attitude of refusal to participate in referentiality
the reader’s creative impulse becomes inhibited, delays its performativity, and becomes
its own past. Thus, it ends up participating in the self-impeding performance of collage
that shapes Snow White’s referential structure.
34  Not  just  because  of  its  lagging  referentiality,  but  also  because  of  its  self-annulling
tendency inherent in its causative structure, the collage of Snow White is pervaded by
anxiety which stems from two sources.  From the perspective of  Levinas’s  ethics,  the
future-directed  self-hindering  performativity  characteristic  of  collage  is  dubbed
indolence in order to emphasize that the possibility of a subjective emergence inherent in
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the time-lag of  its  relation to being/language paradoxically rests in radical  passivity.
Whereas  fatigue  is  the  past-directed  trope  of  referentiality  that  narrates  the  ethical
problem  of  violence  and  sacrifice  inherent  in  the  relation  between  the  literary
subjectivity  and  the  referential  status  of  language,  indolence  is  the  trope  of
performativity whose future-directed structure narrates the text’s passive and traumatic
exposure  to  alterity.  In  other  words,  heralding  the  trauma of  the  passive  exposure,
indolence is indispensable to make complete the process of subjective becoming. In Snow
White the work of indolence is best observable in the episodes featuring Bill’s double, the
lethargic prince-figure Paul.
35  Unlike Bill, Paul rarely worries about his past; rather, he constantly interrogates himself
on “what to do next?” and “what is the next thing demanded of me by history?” (SW 55).
Although he does not do much, spending his days on aimless meditations “in his baff” (SW
13; 94), Paul seems to be Bill’s exact opposite when it comes to contemplating the relation
between  one’s  actions,  especially  artistic  actions,  and  reality.  He  is  an  abstract
expressionist painter who “persists in the image alone” (SW 48), who perceives himself as
“more  experimental  than  he  [his  father]  was”  though  at  the  same  time  as  “more
withdrawn” (SW 27). When he does not paint he “poses” for paintings, pretends to be a
monk, and develops fantasies about perfecting the art of writing palinodes. Sometimes
his reflections are direct, such as when in his “baff” he says: “retraction has a special
allure for me. I would wish to retract everything, if I could, so that the whole written
world would be…” (SW 13). Sometimes Paul’s allusions to creative acts are more veiled,
such as when in a sort of interior monologue his wish to “retract that long black hair
hanging from that  window” develops significantly into a  sociology lecture about  the
abundance of trash (SW 94).
36  Paul’s motivations for retracting everything could be read as symptomatic of a sensibility
that seeks authentication in the undoing of being, were it not for the fact that Paul knows
ultimate reneging to be in the end impossible. Although unlike Bill Paul is not terrified by
the referential character of his enterprise, and for most of the time is satisfied with the
minimalist  poetics  of  creating  by  retracting,  his  creativity  is  haunted  by  the  same
hopelessness as the one found in Bill’s refusals. That the visions of the two characters are
complementary (one might even say, interchangeable) is best expressed by Bill in one of
his melodramatic confessions:
Give me the odd linguistic trip, stutter and fall, and I will be content. Actually, when
you get right down to it, I should be the monk, and Paul the leader here. (SW 139) 
37 Bill is not alone in thinking that Paul’s attitude is more suitable for the role: Hubert’s
reply  to  the  proposal  is  that  the  dwarves  “have  entertained  the  notion”  of  Paul’s
leadership (ibid.). Despite being inert, withdrawn, and passive, Paul nevertheless attracts
other  characters  because  his  attitude  carries  the  promise  of  a  “new  reality.”  Bill’s,
Hubert’s,  and  even  Snow White’s  trust  in  Paul’s  potential  does  not  seem misguided
because he is indeed creative enough to divert the plot of the fairy-tale, the most evident
example of which is his sacrificial act of consuming Snow White’s poisonous drink (SW 
174).
38  If we single out Paul as the carrier of the creativity-related trope of indolence, we cannot
disregard how clearly the prince’s artistic method of retractions and withdrawals,  so
radical as to include the deletion of himself, mirrors the poetic strategy of the novel’s
author. As Barthelme frequently admitted, his literary strategy was fashioned under the
tremendous influence of the minimalist, “retractive” poetics of Waiting for Godot, the text
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which he first read in 1956, and which gave him his ultimate literary model (Moore-
Barthelme 46).12 The autobiographical charge of the trope of indolence becomes evident if
we conceptualize it in the light of the parallelism between Levinas’s ethical moment of
subjective becoming in the linguistic event of the Saying and Deleuze’s idea of affect
understood as the formal substantiation of real emotions. While Deleuze’s perspective
considers  affect  (in general)  to  be an autobiographically  charged element,  the above
Levinas-inspired reading of Snow White traces the autobiographical in two interrelated
affects of indolence and fatigue, whose participation in the plot triggers the emergence of
literary  subjectivity.  Bill’s  anxiety-driven  weariness  about  the  impossibility  of  fully
escaping referentiality and Paul’s counter-productive, retractive creativity textualize the
conflicting  impulses  in  Barthelme’s  novelistic  method,  still  under  construction.
Sometimes,  the  method  tends  towards  the  more  referential,  while  at  other  times  it
attempts to instantiate explosions of non-referential pure nonsense. This is why, in Snow
White,  the  conflict  is  not  only  present  in  the  shifting  volume  of  linguistic
experimentation. It also appears in the shifts of authority between Paul and Bill, of which
the most vivid illustration is that even after Paul’s act of ultimate self-retraction ― his
voluntary death ― Bill’s thematization of the unavoidability of referentiality (the there is
)returns to threaten Paul’s creative acts even after his death:
Bill will become one of those sub-deities who govern the calm passage of cemeteries
through the sky. If the graves fall open in the mid-passage and swathed forms fall
out, it will be his fault, probably. (SW 179) 
39 Read autobiographically, the remark expresses the victory of Barthelme’s recognition of
inescapable referentiality over the dream of its creative overcoming, but at the same
time, it highlights the inseparability of both trends in the constitution of his literary
subjects. 
40  Let me briefly recapitulate what has been said so far about the relation between the
tropes of fatigue and indolence and the novel’s literary subjectivity. By analyzing the
temporal  dynamics  of  Bill’s  affective  condition  and  its  relation  to  the  novel’s  self-
commentary about its literary method, I have argued that because the figure of fatigue
and indolence functions in a more or less explicit connection to the themes of the past,
the origin, the memory, or the process of naming, and because it is always aimed at
foregrounding the violence inherent in these themes’ problem of representation, fatigue
performs in Barthelme’s novel the function of the trope of referentiality. With each instance of
Bill’s tired behavior, the book thematizes its internal uncertainty about the violence of its
referential method of manipulating elements of the surrounding cultural context of the
American  sixties.  When  it  comes  to  the  trope  of  indolence,  and  its  future-directed
potential to transcend referentiality, the potential which is nevertheless blocked starts
playing the role of the trope of performativity. With each instance of Bill’s weariness or Paul’s
exaggerated  indolence,  the  subjectivity  of  Snow  White originates  in  their  inevitable
overlap,  or  time-lag  as  Levinas  calls  it,  in  which  reference  exposes  its  performative
potential whereas speech acts acquire the qualities of undisguised mimetism.
41  A similar conclusion has been formulated by Stanley Trachenberg, who, while defining
Barthelme’s technique of literary collage, concludes: “Barthelme’s fiction does not create
recognizable speech but a reproduction of it, one which evokes not the way people speak
but the way they sound” (167-168). What Trachenberg’s opinion seems to imply is that
Barthelme’s poetics is grounded in a paradoxical strategy of performing representation,
in which performance becomes mimetic and mimetism depicts the idea of performativity,
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thus  enacting  the  temporal  confusion  that  we  have  associated  with  the  hypostatic
moment of subjectivity emerging out of the consciousness of the there is. As a result, at
the most basic level, Snow White is virtually a story about this confusion, a tale about how
the  fatigue  and  indolence  overlap.  This  is  what  makes  up  its  collage  structure  that
Barthelme defines as anxiously oscillating between referentiality and performance.
42  By  manipulating  the  two  tropes  of  fatigue  and  indolence  Snow  White conducts  a
thematization of its self-doubts and a questioning of its textual strategies. Every instance
of the text’s doubting and questioning of its own textual strategies, to which the text as
text has no alternative, is precisely the moment when a literary subjectivity, understood
in Levinas’s terms as a “putting into question” of ontological  certainty and temporal
coherence, has the chance of emerging. What is interesting here is that the emergence of
ethical subjectivity does not have to coincide only with radical literary experimentation;
in Snow White it substantiates itself in fragments which amplify the referential within the
referential without resorting to self-referentiality or auto-thematization.
43  Of  course,  the  ethical  subjectivity  emerges  only  temporarily,  since  the  necessity  of
ontological closure,  dictated most ostentatiously by the very physicality of the novel,
causes Snow White’s discourse to plunge back to the rhythm of the there is. Interestingly,
the  book  allegorizes  this  process  by  means  of  a  strikingly  regular  sequence of
punishments which follow Bill’s refusals.  It is as if every attempt to break out of the
totalizing ontological subjectivity model had to be met with a reprisal from one of the
existing,  totalizing  philosophical  or  religious  thought  paradigms.  The  ideology  that
haunts Bill after his first refusal, namely, when he develops a shamble, is named plainly:
he is  being “followed by a nun” (SW 71).  In the second case,  the totalizing frame of
thought seems to be that  of  modernist  aesthetics.  When Bill  “refuses to take off  his
pajamas” like everyone else,  the narrative terminates abruptly and its  perspective is
uncontrollably distorted as the pajamas “in a sense” “fill the room” (SW 106), so that all
the  semantic  brutality  which  Bill  himself  was  desperately  trying  to  avoid  is  now
mercilessly exercised upon him. Finally, Bill’s various subversive actions are undercut by
the economic rationale: each time he adopts a passive-resistant attitude to the communal
life, by either refusing to sing chants while “washing the buildings,” and “tending the
vats,” or just generally refusing to continue working, “the loss of equanimity” among the
dwarves  becomes  so  critical  that  eventually  they  decide  to  exterminate  their
unproductive  leader  (SW  112).  In  this  way,  the  descriptions  of  Bill’s  endeavors  to
challenge the murderousness of the language of the Said, to subvert the referential from
within  the  referential,  are  always  undercut  by  the  narrative  subservience  to  one
totalizing idea or another.
44  Yet  among  those  hypostatic  becomings  of  the  novel’s  subjectivity,  occasionally
interrupting what might be called the “discursive noise” of the pre-subjective there is
represented by Snow White, there is one which exemplifies the subjective event in the
most striking manner. Not only does it demonstrate how fatigue and indolence signify the
tracing of performative representations and referential performativity, but also points to
an understanding of the relation between the ethical moment of their co-presence with
the moment’s political potential.
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3. From Ethical Hypostasis to Political Resistance 
45  Answering Snow White’s wish to hear words she has never heard before, Bill proposes
the word “Injunctions!” (SW 6). Although initially Bill’s proposal might be understood
through the context of his aversion to touch as a fairly straightforward formulation of a
demand for solitude, its true significance is actually revealed in the novel’s final scene,
the scene of Bill’s court hearing. As he explains to the court how and why he has hurt his
childhood scoutmasters Fondue and Maeght, it becomes clear that the legal sense of the
word  injunction  is  nothing  but  a  summary  of  Bill’s  campaign  throughout  the  novel
against any violent incursions of literary language on the real. That this rebellion is a
signal of ethical subversion and of political dissidence may become clearer if we consider
a fragment of the interrogation scene:
“‘Bill,’ to return to your entanglement of former times with Fondue and Maeght, in
what relation did they stand, in those times,” “They stood to me in the relation,
scoutmasters.” “They were your scoutmasters. Entrusted with your schoolment in
certain  dimensions  of  lore.”  “Yes,  the  duty  of  the  scoutmasters  was  to  reveal
scoutmysteries.”  “And what  was  the  nature  of  the  latter?”  “The scoutmysteries
included  such  things  as  the  mystique  of  rope,  the  mistake  of  one  animal  for
another, and the miseries of the open air.” “Yes. Now, was this matter of the great
black horse included under the rubric, scoutmysteries.” “No. it was in the nature of
a threat,  a  punishment.  I  had infracted a rule.”  “What rule?” “A rule of  thumb
having to do with pots. You were supposed to scour the pots with mud, to clean
them.  I  used Ajax.”  “That  was  a  scoutmystery,  how to  scour  a  pot  with mud?”
“Indeed.” “The infraction was then, resistance to scoutmysteries?” “Stated in the
most general terms, that would be it.” “And what was the response of Fondue and
Maeght.” “They told me that there was a great black horse, and that it had in mind,
eating me.” “They did?” “It would come by night, they said. I lay awake waiting.”
Did it present itself? The horse?” “No. But I awaited it. I await it still.” (SW 163-4)
46 According to Paul Maltby, such passages instantiate the politically dissident poetics of
“sign-reflectiveness,” that is, a poetics of “laying bare the process of signification,” and
therefore “permitting a degree of disengagement from the sign system” (42). As a sign-
reflective episode,  Bill’s  testimony critiques  the cruelty of  ideological  repression and
systemic coercion that perform their enslaving job dressed up as innocent (childlike/
scout-like) “scoutmysteries.” In the light of such an Althusserian vision, Bill’s refusal to
treat the horse as an empty metaphor defamiliarizes the problem of the fact that despite
their imaginary origin, ideological systems have real consequences. The most visible of
those, as feminist critics of Snow White point out, is the barring of the title character’s
actual concerns (probably listed in that poem we never actually hear that begins with
“bandaged and wounded”) from the “authorized version of reality” and her place in its
social structures (Berman, 126).
47  Snow White’s example once again draws attention to the actuality of the system’s effect,
Bill’s personal tragedy is where political subversiveness uncovers its ethical source. Bill’s
transgression  of  the  law  that  has  brought  him  before  the  tribunal,  as  well  as  his
testimony,  disclose  his  conviction  that  no linguistic  reference  is  innocent,  and  that
performative  acts  of  language  such  as  the  threat  of  a  black  horse  have  concrete
consequences. For the threat of the horse which Bill “still awaits” turns out to have been
the  sole  source  of  all  his  withdrawals  and  refusals.  Furthermore,  provided  that  the
Freudian connotations of the image of the horse are too imposing to go unnoticed ― just
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as in The Dead Father,Barthelme lays bare his allusion to Freud’s metaphor by making this
animization of the unconscious dark and mute ― one is justified in interpreting Bill’s fear
as a sense of being threatened by the return of the repressed, that is, by an encapsulation
of his identity within the depth model of subjectivity, where violence towards the real is a
mode of existence.
48  Just like the ethical aspect of Snow White’s situation was not discussed in the feminist
readings,  the  ethical  dimension  of  Bill’s  rebellion  is  not  accounted  for  in  Maltby’s
interpretative  scheme.  However,  Maltby’s  idea  that  the  poetics  of  sign-reflectiveness
“redeems” the possibility of critical detachment makes it possible to move his political
reading towards its ethical conclusions. If, from Maltby’s perspective, Bill’s imitation of
formal, legal jargon through the invention of terms such as “schoolment” would mark
political  “resistance to the prevailing forms of language […] by means of  a discourse
which defies assimilation to linguistic norms” (46), the perspective of Levinas’s ethics
expands this conclusion by accounting for the complex temporal processes of reference
and performativity that partake of rebellious shattering by such words as “schoolment”
(or expressions such as “dimensions of lore”) of the integrity of language norms of the
Said.
49  Bill’s  testimony  describes  the  details  of  the  process.  Asked  about  the  nature  of
scoutmysteries,  Bill  remembers  three  which combine  into  a  noteworthy sequence  of
“mystique” - “ mistake” - “mystery,” faithfully depicting the process of signification and
thus  the  complex  process  of  subjective  emergence  in  the  referential  collage  of
Barthelme’s  text.  Beginning  with  the  “mystique,”  especially  the  “mystique  of  rope,”
reminiscent  of  the  image  of  Snow  White’s  hair  as  a  metaphor  of  creativity  and
interactivity, we might associate its fascinating aura of awe and power with that moment
in the evolution of the subject when, as Levinas describes it, the consciousness of one’s
immersion in the there is slowly consolidates itself in the mode of egoistic search for
satisfaction  and  mastery  over  the  surrounding  reality.  In  Barthelme’s  definition  of
collage, whose structural development resembles that of Levinas’s subjective coming out
of the there is, the stage of the “mystique of rope” marks the beginning of the referential
process. It corresponds to the moment of incorporation of elements of the extra-textual,
“past” reality into the body of collage. The name of the next stage in the sequence of
subjective  development  in  Snow  White  could  not  be  defined  any  better  than  as  a
“mistake,”  and  particularly  a  “mistake  of  one  animal  for  another,”  because  it  is
synonymous  with the  meaning of  hypostasis  as  a  substantiation of  the  subject,  as  a
performative substitution of one being for the Other, and as a logical error. In the narrative of
Snow White,particularly in such moments as Bill’s testimony, when the realist and the
absurd become one, ‘mistake’ in all of those senses constitutes the central moment in the
process of subjective development.13 Not only does the name of this scoutmystery obey
the  hypostatic  grammar,  but  it  also  successfully  captures  the  logic  of  substitution,
operating in those moments in the text where, as described earlier, the text questions and
exposes itself passively to the otherness of the reader. Again, in Barthelme’s description
of collage dynamics,  this is  the moment of  the anxious temporal  confusion in which
referentiality  and  performativity  give  rise  to  a  “new”  reality.  Such  a  becoming,  an
exposure,  opens  the  subject  to  the  “misery”  of  being  hostage  to  the  situation  of
ontological doubt, because it shatters its dream of ontological certainty. No wonder it is
such a traumatizing and anxiety-ridden state. However, it is also the only vista leading to
“the open air” of subjectivity.
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50  Both political  and ethical  interpretations  of  Snow White view the “mystery-mistake-
misery” sequence as a laying bare of the process of signification. However, whereas the
political reading perceives this defamiliarization as permitting a critically detached active
judgment of the sign system and its ideological implications, the ethical one interprets it
as opening the possibility of the passive exposure to alterity which is the only source of a
successful rebellion. After all, ethics-wise, the subject’s entry into language is not an act
of self-positing by means of critical  detachment but rather the act of passivity of an
exposure. The words neither record nor represent or signify exposure, but rather affect it
in the process of reading, so that the collage actually brings into life a new, politically
dissident discursive reality.
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NOTES
1.  Although he will later return to the collage principle in the 1976 “Symposium on Fiction”
(“Symposium” 24) or the 1978 interview with Heide Ziegler, which brings into play the famous
“Corbu, Mies, Neutra” architectural analogy to collage (Ziegler & Bigsby 52-53), it is in this 1971
conversation with his later bibliographer that Barthelme formulates his definition of collage with
the greatest precision.
2.  Barthelme’s definition of collage writing in one gesture affirms the existence of the concrete
affectively charged relation between the text and the real, and locates the core of this relation in
the temporal confusion of linguistic performativity in which progressive creativity overlaps and
becomes identical with regressive referentiality. However, the writer’s overt affirmation of the
referential as well as the affective aspect of collage was consistently ignored by his critics. Even
the first apparent exception to this rule, Philip Stevick’s 1981 study of Barthelme’s technique,
gradually moves away from its initial  assumption that the writer’s  collage method “far from
being pure design” serves a “classic” mimetic function, towards the conclusion about the self-
referentiality of verbal junctures (Alternative Pleasures 23-25). It was as late as in 1991 that Jerome
Klinkowitz finally acknowledged both the referential power and the implications of the temporal
indeterminacy of the collage structure. In his monographic study of Barthelme’s work entitled
Donald  Barthelme:  An  Exhibition,  Klinkowitz  historicized  collage  as  the  dominant  method  of
Barthelme’s early fiction, by juxtaposing it with another technique of combining fragments, the
silk-screening, which he nominates as the governing principle of Barthelme’s work from The Dead
Father period. In his comparative description of collage and silk-screening,  Klinkowitz argues
that  whereas  silk-screening  lets  all  elements  of  the  composition “perform  an  equally  valid
syntactic and referential function within the same smooth phase,” collage does not disguise its
fragmentary character, leading to an instantaneous disruption of the reading experience and the
creation of a new reality (Donald Barthelme 8). Instead of shock, which is the first impact of the
collage,  the effect  of  silk-screening seems initially acceptable to the reader’s  “censors of  the
ridiculous,”  even though in  fact  it  is  “a  clever  little  time bomb” that  soon shatters  his/her
understanding  of  the  text  (ibid.).  Otherwise  put,  if  silk-screening exploits  the  illusion of  the
mimetic  optics  in  a  more deceptive  but  also  less  disturbing manner  of  a  delayed effect,  the
collage targets the core of this illusion in each of its fragments so that its temporal logic becomes
impossible to reconstruct.  It  is  hard to overestimate the clarity and accuracy of Klinkowitz’s
analysis, however, the valorization of collage as inferior to silk-screening seems to miss the point
of this technique’s performative potential. The shock and profound disturbance of the reader,
which results from the reception of this technique, establishes the moment of the most intimate
contact between the text and the reader.
3.  According  to  Levinas,  the  subject  formation  process  involves  three  stages:  the  anxiety
triggered by the recognition of the there is develops into desire and enjoyment that are symptoms
of the self’s affective non-indifference, which in turn give way to the subjectivity-forming ethical
affect of responsibility for the Other.
4.  Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
Duquesne University Press, 2003). All subsequent references are to this edition and are shortened
to EE.
5.  That the project of construing Snow White’s subjectivity through the lens of Levinasian ethics
might be worth the effort is suggested by the most recent piece of criticism on Barthelme’s first
novel, the 2005 essay “Disastrous Aesthetics: Irony, Ethics, and Gender in Barthelme’s Snow White
” by Jeffrey T. Nealon. In the essay, Nealon observes that despite their intentions, the existing
readings of Snow White define the book’s radicalism as stemming from the strategy of distorted
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reproduction of  traditional  aesthetic  ideas  (125),  whereas  a  truly  postmodern subversiveness
should come, as he repeats after Blanchot, from the performance of an aesthetic disaster (135).
This performance carries the promise of opening literature to a response, i.e.  the promise of
actually reifying the postmodern polyphony; however, it always occurs at the cost of the literary
work’s ontological coherence. According to Nealon, Snow White stops short of such an ethically
fertile catastrophe; however, applying Levinas in a bit different way from Nealon I would like to
argue that it indeed possible to trace in Snow White a series of radically ethical tropes.
6.  “Saying” is Levinas’s term for the event of language in which the ontological certainty of this
language, and thus also of the subject who is constituted bythis language, is totally shattered.
Levinas opposes this dynamic, contestatory type of language use to the “Said,” i.e. to linguistic
rules,  norms,  and conventions that  create the illusion of  comprehensibility  in relations with
Others and perpetuate the belief in the possibility of self-expression.
7.  What comes to mind as an illustrative definition of the role of Barthelme’s insertions, is the
atmosphere of a room buzzing with bits of street conversations coming through an open window,
which by  the  way,  according  to  Helen Moore  Barthelme and Jerome Klinkowitz, was  one  of
Barthelme’s  favorite  and  most  notorious  research  methods  in  his  poetic  strategy.  In  her
biographical The Genesis of the Cool Sound, Barthelme recalls her husband writing his first fiction
seated near the window onto a busy Houston street and fishing for conversation lines, whereas
Klinkowitz in his Keeping Literary Company makes the point about the sounds and situations on the
street of Greenwich Village becoming the undigested material of Barthelme’s fiction (112-120).
Such an intrusion of background sounds is of the same kind as the murmuring heard from behind
the wall in Levinas’s definition of the there is as insomnia. It also signifies that which cannot be
disposed of and exited, that which remains, once the subject-to-be discovers that his subjectivity
will not be established by the relation to being but by a momentary transgression of being and its
abundance in his/her exposure to the Other.
8.  Such is the focus of Paul Maltby’s reading of Snow White in Dissident Postmodernists to which I
turn at the end of this article.
9.  It is precisely their temporality that makes it possible to speak of fatigue and indolence as
tropes.
10.  If Bill is right in asserting Snow White’s attachment to the idea of authenticity, that is, to the
ontological  paradigm  of  subjectivity,  then  his  judgment  constitutes  yet  another reason  for
interpreting Snow White as a thematization of the Levinasian there is.
11.  Returning to Bill’s confession about his artistic failure, let us note that its illocutionary effect
of  the  second  person  pronoun  differs  dramatically  from  the  effect  of  Barthelme’s  famous
questionnaire for Snow White’sreaders — containing questions such as “Do you like the story so
far? Yes (  ) No (  )” or “Is there too much blague in the narration? (  )” ― that terminates part one
of the novel (SW 82-83). Despite its interactive outlook, the questionnaire does not invite the
reader’s response in the way that it is done in the case of Bill’s refusal to creatively exploit the
“mystery”  of  language’s  referentiality  even  if  it  means  his  public’s  disappointed  “weeping”
(“SW” 303, SW 51).  While Bill’s  speech exposes the book to the readers’  creative activity,  the
questionnaire is a totalizing act of authorization which powerfully reinserts into Snow White the
element of  Barthelme’s  control  ―  a  synonym for the desire for authenticity and ontological
closure — thus hindering the possibility of the reader’s responsiveness to the events of parts two
and three of the novel.
12.  While  I  repeat  this  biographical  detail  after  the  author  of  The  Genesis  of  the  Cool  Sound,
Barthelme’s  fascination  with  Beckett  is  very  well  known  and  has  been  acknowledged  and
discussed  in  virtually  every  interview  as  well  as  in  most  critical  essays  on  the  postmodern
character of Barthelme’s poetics. For a relatively recent and refreshing example of how the two
writers can be brought together see Lance Olsen’s “Narrative Overdrive: Postmodern Fantasy,
Deconstruction, and Cultural Critique in Beckett and Barthelme,” The Fantastic Other: An Interface
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of  Perspectives.  Eds.  Brett Cooke, George Edgar Slusser and Jaume Marti-Olivella,
(Amsterdam & Atlanta GA: Rodopi Press, 1998), 71-86.
13.  Other typically hypostatic moments are, for example, Snow White’s watering the flowers to
aid the “blooming” of Maoist revolution, or Hogo’s allowing his plan to cool down in the specially
constructed “humidor,” and many others.
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The  essay  examines  Donald  Barthelme’s  Snow  White’s  from  the  perspective  of  the  ethical
philosophy  of  Emmanuel  Levinas.  Drawing  on  a  reciprocity  between  Barthelme’s  collage
principle and Levinas’s notion of the there is, the paper applies the concept in the analysis of Snow
White’s referential and affect construction strategies. The novel is proven to textualize the ethical
dimension  of  Barthelme’s  referential  uses  of  language,  while  the  figure  of  Snow  White  is
demonstrated to be the trope of the referentiality-performativity conflict that lies at the core of
a literary collage. The tension between referentiality and performativity is further developed in
Barthelme’s novel via the figures of Bill and Paul, who, in the context of Levinas’s concepts of
fatigue and indolence respectively, are interpreted as the tropological markers of the temporal
mechanism of  Snow White’s  collage.  Accordingly,  Bill’s  constant  weariness  is  interpreted as  a
trope of referentiality, and Paul’s inertia as narrating the mechanism of language performatives.
Since  the  suspension  between the  two  tropes  propels  the  text’s  constant  self-questioning,  a
process mirroring Levinas’s idea of how ethical subjectivity hypostatically emerges in language
as  a  questioning  of  its  ontological  stability,  it  is  argued  that  the  mechanism  of  subject
construction strategy in Snow White follows a similar logic.
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